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This paper analyses the possibility of left populism to trigger 
class consciousness with what Laclau calls populist subjects. 
The author argues that populist subjects and class conscious-
ness are not identical nor interchangeable concepts in respect 
to the classical Marx and Engels notion on the proletarian class. 
In the first part of the paper, the author sets a description of 
populism based on its three key features: reaction, the notion 
of the people, and the struggle. In the second part, the idea of 
class consciousness is analysed, showing that class conscious-
ness is necessarily political. In the third part of the paper, the 
idea of left populism is explored by using the findings of the 
second part of the paper, showing structural inconsistencies in 
the idea of the populist subject.
POPULISM TO THE LEFT:
Democratisation and class consciousness
Original Scientific PaperBojan Vranić 
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Explorations on populism have 
advanced in the past decade with such haste 
that it is now safe to speak of a whole new 
branch of studies in political science, name-
ly populism studies. The subject matter has 
been approached from various points of 
view: economical, sociological, institution-
al, structural, comparative. However, an 
ideological approach has remained at the 
core of the studies: populism seems to be set 
in stone as a thin-centred ideology (Mudde 
& Kaltwasser, 2017). It is still common to 
speak of populism as a project from the right 
ideological specter or, more recently, of the 
centrist populism. This is a consequence of 
the political fact that in the past two dec-
ades, right-wing populism has had some of 
its major successes, such as the UKIP and 
Brexit campaign in 2016, Marine Le Pen’s 
presidential candidacy in 2017, or the suc-
cesses of AFD in the local and national elec-
tions that resulted in becoming the second 
most popular party in Germany in 2018, 
just ahead from the SDP (DW, 2018). 
The studies of populism are character-
ised by a gap between political science and 
political theory. While the former concerns 
itself with the actual political phenomenon, 
the later tries to explore and justify politi-
cal ideas that still float somewhere between 
reality and hypothesis. The state of politi-
cal theory of populism can, almost without 
any residues, be applied to what has been on 
and off in relevant literature referred to as 
left populism. With punctual political suc-
cess (mostly in Latin America), left pop-
ulism has remained an intellectual current 
derived from the works of Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe. The ideas and con-
cepts that constitute left populism are tan-
gential and sometimes overlapping with 
concepts of democracy and democratisa-
tion, the people, neoliberalism and the free 
market, and the role of the state and its 
(hegemonic) institutions. 
This level of conceptual development 
of left populism allows us today to dive 
into nuances of conceptual meaning and 
explore its reaches. My goal in this paper is 
to explore one such nuance, namely wheth-
er the concept of democratisation (as it 
is used in the left populism theories) can 
result in the emergence of a class conscious-
ness of designated groups that transcends 
the working class as the traditional bearer 
of the idea. Both democracy and class con-
sciousness are connected with concepts of 
identity, direct action, institutional change, 
and anti-capitalists struggle; therefore, it 
should be relatively simple to reach the con-
clusion that a devoted left populist move-
ment can lead to the socio-political radical 
change all Marxists dream of. 
This paper demonstrates that the idea 
of democracy triggered by left populism 
doesn’t necessarily lead to the rise of a new 
political identity (and even less, entity) that 
is presupposed by the idea of class con-
sciousness. In a nutshell, my argument is 
that left populism generates a political class, 
which falls under what Marx and Engels 
called an illusion of the époque. Therefore, 
my argument is theoretical in its nature 
whereby I analyse the idea of left populism 
from the viewpoint of political philosophy. 
The empirical side of left populism is only 
secondary to my goal to explore the struc-
tural and logical consistency of one of its 
key ideas, the democratisation of the soci-
ety. In the first part of the paper I examine 
some of the key elements of the definition(s) 
of populism and left populism in particular. 
In the second part I give an account of class 
consciousness, starting from Marx and 
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Engels’s idea to the more recent neo-Marx-
ist interpretations. In the concluding part of 
the paper I compare the ideas of democracy 
and class consciousness, showing where left 
populism fails.
DEFINING POPULISM: TWO STEPS 
RIGHT, ONE STEP LEFT 
It has become common now to state at 
a beginning of a text that there are various 
definitions of populism. There are authors 
(Taggart, 2000) who explain this cacopho-
ny by referring to populism as an essentially 
contested concept. Weather this is truly so 
is not a primary concern of my paper. My 
goal in this part of the paper is to compare 
the definitions of right and left populism to 
see if there are at least some minimal defini-
tional overlaps. 
Populism is often seen as a perverse side 
of politics. This doesn’t necessarily carry a 
bad connotation. It simply states that pop-
ulism tends to be (more or less radically) 
different from what is considered to be a 
mainstream pattern of politics. Therefore, 
I argue that the most important feature of 
populism is that it is reactionary. Populism 
is not an organic type of politics that emerg-
es on its own. It ranges somewhere from the 
consequence of the perceptiveness of cor-
ruption of mainstream political institutions 
to being an epiphenomenon. In relevant 
literature (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2005), 
in particular on right-wing populism, it is 
often argued that this reactionary politics 
emerges from what is perceived as the devi-
ance of the representative democracy or lib-
eral democracy. 
The problem with the populist deviance 
is that it is always heavily contextualised. In 
the studies of Western European populism 
and populistic movements, the deviance of 
the representation is more often than not 
connected to the cleavage between nation-
al, multicultural, and supranational state, 
raising the question who constitutes the 
general will and carries the sovereignty. For 
that reason, scholars such as Mudde and 
Kaltwasser (2017: 34) write arguably about 
the connection of nationalism and pop-
ulism that results in authoritarianism and 
right-wing policies: “Hence, the xenopho-
bic nature of current European populism 
derives from a very specific conception of 
the nation, which relies on an ethnic and 
chauvinistic denomination of the peo-
ple. This means that populism, authoritar-
ianism, and nativism are experiencing a 
kind of marriage of convenience in Europe 
nowadays.”
In Latin America, however, this kind of 
populism is more an exception than a rule 
(e.g. Evo Morales’s policies of true natives of 
Bolivia vs. colonisers from Europe (Panizza, 
2005: 17)). The logic of populist reactionary 
politics is different in this context, name-
ly it draws its consistency from a resist-
ance to capitalism and neoliberal politics 
in particular. In his recent book of histor-
ical analysis of genesis of populism, Feder-
ico Finchelstein (2017: 199) provides a list of 
(neo)populistic regimes in Latin America 
that belonged to the left ideological specter: 
“The Kirchner administrations in Argen-
tina (2003–15), Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) 
and Nicolás Maduro (2013–) in Venezuela, 
Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007–17) …”. 
The difference between right and left 
populism is structural in its nature. While 
the former rests on the grounds that the 
society’s key problems are in the inadequacy 
of political institutions, the latter targets the 
grounds of (capitalist) economy. Populisms 
from each side of the ideological specter 
find that equality is the cornerstone of the 
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critique and the key agent for the political 
mobilisation. From the right side, populists 
claim that people have become too equal, 
and that true equality can only be achieved 
within the idea of pure people constituting 
the nation. Left populism claims that ine-
quality has corrupted the socio-economic 
relations in a society: weather we speak of 
elite vs. mass cleavage, the distribution of 
wealth, globalising institutions that negates 
national social policies, once we achieve 
economic equality all corrupting influences 
upon society will be dispelled. 
This leads me to the second common fea-
ture of all populist definitions, the notion 
of the people. There is no straightforward 
definition of the people that we can assign 
to the populist use of it. As Margaret Cano-
van (2002: 34) puts it, the people are often 
considered as “a corporate body with a 
continuous existence over time, capable of 
having common interests and a common 
will.” From this corporate feature, Canovan 
(2002: 34) derives a conclusion that pop-
ulism tends to treat people as a nation: “But 
its sovereign independence of external pow-
ers also gives it territorial definition, linking 
its borders to the boundaries of the polity, 
while its essential unity narrows down its 
identity, making it equivalent to the nation.”
Again, this equivalence is true only if 
certain contextual historical and ideologi-
cal determinacies take place. Where we are 
faced with strong feelings regarding nation 
and nationality, in those societies it is more 
likely that populism will try to link the idea 
of the people to nation, designating it as 
the true people (consequently creating the 
idea of the others). This kind of discourse 
is again connected to the ideas of the right-
winged populism. As Müller (2015: 83) sug-
gests in his definition, populism tends to 
be perceived as “a political world, which 
places in opposition a morally pure and 
fully unified people against small minor-
ities, elites in particular, who are placed 
outside the authentic people.” These “small 
minorities” are clearer if termed as identi-
ties, since right-winged populism tends to 
contest everything that doesn’t fit into the 
true people mould. Therefore, on the right 
side of the specter, the people are designat-
ed as ethnos. 
This designation doesn’t stand necessar-
ily for the left side of the specter. Left pop-
ulism rather terms the people as demos. The 
use of demos here is specific, and it requires 
some clarification. In the standard use of 
the term, the demos usually refer to those 
layers of the society that participate in 
power sharing activities. However, as stat-
ed before, populism is a reactionary politics, 
implying that it mobilises not those who 
share power, rather those who are deprived 
of any means of power-sharing. In a more 
traditional leftists dictionary, this deprived 
class is designated as the proletariat. There 
is, however, a difference between proletariat 
and demos: the former is deprived of prop-
erty, while the latter is deprived of polit-
ical rights. The reason why left populism 
changed the Marxist narrative of depriva-
tion lies in the changed historical circum-
stances in which liberal democracy has 
hegemony over all other societal forms of 
democratic government; as Benjamin Ardi-
ti (2007: 50) judiciously puts it, populism is 
“a spectre” that haunts democracy. 
The changed narrative of deprivation is 
the result of left populism’s efforts to recon-
figure what Laclau (2005: 33) calls “the logic 
of articulation”. The reconfiguration means 
that the logic of the political struggle has 
changed and that motivational goals that 
left parties and movements target should 
follow this wind of change. A change of 
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strategy, however, doesn’t imply that left 
populism gives up the idea of property dep-
rivation as the core of inequalities, just the 
idea that capitalist economy is the only or at 
least primary source of inequalities (Mouffe, 
2018: 81). Left populism tends to solve the 
problem of political inequality, by recon-
figuring the logic of articulation of exiting 
a political institution making them more 
responsive to the will of the demos. 
Paul Cammack’s (2000) account on the 
logic of articulation of the populism in 
Latin America gives one of the best theo-
retical overviews of the reconfigurational 
efforts of left populism in general. Follow-
ing Ernesto Laclau’s argument, Cammack 
(2000: 153) argues that capitalism rests 
on the idea of the demand: property hold-
ers need opposition in a property-deprived 
class to leverage them with salaries. This 
property conditioning enables the property 
holders to exploit the work force of the pro-
letariat, while the latter use the salaries to 
survive. The economic logic of articulation 
of societal relation between those two class-
es is necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
for continuous exploitation. For capitalism 
to thrive, it requires a political element, i.e. 
the state institutions that provide continu-
ity of class relations. Put differently: “One 
of a number of essential roles of political 
institutions under capitalism, therefore, is 
to mediate between the minority who rule 
and the majority who must not, to block the 
direct enforcement of the interests of the 
propertyless majority, and to work to make 
it more likely that people will actually make 
political choices which respect the practic-
es and disciplines which capitalism requires” 
(Cammack 2000: 153). 
Left populism is therefore structural-
ly connected to capitalism, but it targets 
political institutions and their inability to 
reproduce legitimacy of the existing eco-
nomic model (Cammack 2000, 157). Pop-
ulism became a new strategy of the left 
because social-democracy also plays an 
important role in legitimising capitalism: 
“Under the pretext of the ‘modernisation’ 
imposed by globalisation, social-democrat-
ic parties have accepted the diktats of finan-
cial capitalism and the limits they imposed 
to state interventions and their redistribu-
tive policies” (Mouffe, 2018: 32). Those are 
some of the main reason why the deprived 
class feels resentful towards the existing 
institutional establishment and why it is 
filled with negative passions (Mouffe, 2005: 
55). These passions are unarticulated and 
can be turned both into generating ethnic 
cleavages (as right-wing populism does) 
or, as left populists hope for, to radically 
change the face of the democratic intuitions. 
On these grounds, left populism establish-
es its strategies to expand the notion of the 
proletariat to the notion of the demos.
Finally, the third feature of definitions of 
populism is the notion of a political struggle. 
There are again at least two ways to describe 
this notion. The first rests upon the socio-
logical fact of the elite vs. mass cleavage. The 
“denunciation of the elites” (Mudde & Kalt-
wasser, 2017: 5) is the cornerstone of pop-
ulist attacks against liberal governments. 
In the context of liberal (Western) democ-
racies, it would be more precise to speak of 
“the establishment” than of the elites. The 
establishment, being an elusive term, allows 
the researchers to better understand the 
nature of a populist struggle. Its target is not 
necessarily the elites who hold the power, 
rather the minorities who are in opposition 
to the true people. Right-wing populism 
usually targets two of such minorities: eth-
nic minorities and bureaucrats. In the for-
mer case, the difference is weather we are 
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researching old or new democracies. In old 
western democracies, minorities are usual-
ly tied to immigration issues, where immi-
grants are treated as those who are making 
the true people underprivileged, by taking 
away their jobs, social aid, etc. The France 
National is the scholarly example of a pop-
ulist party whose main target are immi-
grants. However, in new (post-communist) 
democracies, ethnic cleavages are connect-
ed to the existing, sometimes centuries old 
struggles against the ethnic majority and 
minority. The Caesaristic populism of Slo-
bodan Milošević was a prime example of 
the kind of policy outcomes of such a polit-
ical struggle. 
The second type of political strug-
gle against the establishment is connect-
ed to the centre-right populism and aimed 
against the bureaucrats. Here again is the 
question of representation being the key 
one, but the logic of articulation is differ-
ent. The bureaucrats, e.g. EU commission-
ers, judiciary, various regulatory bodies, 
and similar forms of independent political 
controls are found by populist movements 
to be illegitimate. For centre-right populists, 
these liberal forms of government control 
are illegitimate because they are not derived 
from the sovereign will of the people and 
therefore, they do not belong to the world of 
politics. Populistic demand is that the con-
trol needs to be put back into people’s hands, 
striping it away from a traditional liberal 
check and balance type of institution. That 
is why this populism is often termed as illib-
eral. Examples of it can be found in Viktor 
Orban’s struggle against EU administra-
tion in Hungary and in Jaroslav Kaczńyski’s 
struggle against the judiciary in Poland. 
It is well known that in recent years pop-
ulistic movements are becoming an impor-
tant political force. In her latest book, For 
a Left Populism, Chantal Mouffe (2018: 23) 
terms this period as “the populist moment”: 
“We can speak of a ‘populist moment’ when, 
under the pressure of political or socio-
economic transformations, the dominant 
hegemony is being destabilised by the mul-
tiplication of unsatisfied demands. In such 
situations, the existing institutions fail to 
secure the allegiance of the people as they 
attempt to defend the existing order. As 
a result, the historical bloc that provides 
the social basis of a hegemonic formation 
is being disarticulated and the possibili-
ty arises of constructing a new subject of 
collective action – the people – capable of 
reconfiguring a social order experienced 
as unjust.” She argues that left populism 
should use this moment in which political 
relations are still amorph and reconfigure 
them in the conditions of increased democ-
ratisation. Put in a more traditional Marx-
ist vocabulary, left populism should use the 
existing crisis of liberalism caused by right-
winged populism to shape the class con-
sciousness of the demos. I will return to this 
point, once I analyse the idea of class con-
sciousness in the next part of the paper. 
POLITICAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS? 
The question raised by the subtitle can 
have at least two meanings. One wonders 
whether a political class can have a con-
sciousness, or if class consciousness can be 
political. Both of these puzzles overlap in 
the idea of left populism. However, to fully 
understand the consequence of these mean-
ings, I will return to Marx’s original idea of 
class consciousness. 
There is no clear definition of class con-
sciousness, only several accounts scattered 
in some of Marx and Engels’s early works 
(e.g. The Communist Manifesto, German 
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Ideology and The Critique of Political 
Economy). Therefore, I turn to exploring 
the possibilities for answering the question 
raised above. In The Communist Manifesto 
(CM), Marx and Engels (1948: 18) famous-
ly stated, “every class struggle is a political 
struggle”. To determine the relation to the 
aforementioned struggles, one must under-
stand the nature of this “is”. The relation-
ship established between class and political 
struggle can be analysed in two ways. The 
“is” can be understood as a relation of iden-
tity and a relation of equivalence. In the 
former case, a class struggle and political 
struggle are interchangeable: one can freely 
use both of these terms in any related con-
text without losing its meaning. Each polit-
ical struggle is in its nature a class struggle 
and vice versa. In the latter case, a political 
struggle is defined by conditions of the class 
struggle: no process is truly political if in 
its basis lies no class conflict. The relation 
between class and political struggle is not of 
identity, albeit that of consequence. 
In CM there’s no detailed elaboration of 
the nature of this relation. From this polit-
ical programme, the nature of the relation 
can only be inferred from the definitions of 
the concept of class and the political attrib-
ute. The class is clearly defined in every 
Marx and Engels’s work as the social group 
that is determined by the economic system. 
Perhaps the best definition can be found 
in the “Preface” for A Contribution to The 
Critique of Political Economy in the semi-
nal line: “It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence but, on the 
contrary, their social existence determines 
their consciousness” (Marx 1904: 11-12). 
This means, as Marx (1904: 11) argues, that 
“in the social production which man carry 
on they enter into definite relation that are 
indispensable and independent of their 
will”. Classes are, therefore, a social mir-
ror of human existence in a particular his-
tory, a history that depends on a dominant 
mode of production. Belonging to a class 
means taking upon oneself the social role 
of oppressor or the oppressed. The notion 
of the class goes beyond the idea of the rep-
resentation, defended by the liberals; classes 
are chains, which one can pull or be pulled 
with. 
For this reason, the nature of class histo-
ry is one of struggles (Marx & Engels, 1948: 
9). From the lexical nature of the sentence 
“political struggle” it is clear that struggles 
are necessarily political ones. I don’t bring 
this claim into question; what I’m con-
cerned about is the domain of the attribute 
political, weather it includes classes, or they 
stand independent in its domain. In CM, 
Marx and Engels give only few examples 
about the relation of the class and the polit-
ical. They only briefly state that each strug-
gle necessarily leads to centralisation on a 
national level and that starting victories 
for the proletariat (prior to the revolution) 
are won on a legislative level. Since CM is 
a political manifesto, it is only natural that 
a political struggle is seen as a call for the 
mobilisation of the proletariat, i.e. rallying, 
protesting, destruction of the machines etc. 
More on the political nature of a struggle 
can be found in The German Ideology (GI). 
In this collection of works on German ide-
alism, Marx and Engels provide us with an 
interesting feature of the class. It seems that 
class is a form of group interaction that is 
a necessarily national one (Marx & Engels, 
1974: 80). Put differently, classes are also a 
mode of production that go beyond material 
objects that satisfy only biological needs of 
humans. Sum & Jessop (2013: 117) elaborate 
this point by drawing on arguments from 
GI: “These founding fathers of historical 
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materialism argued that production is the 
production of a mode of life – not just the 
satisfaction of immediate physical needs. It 
has a day-to-day, life-cycle and intergener-
ational aspects, and involves both immedi-
ate production and the production of the 
material and social conditions that enable 
production to occur. A crucial moment of 
this is language, which, as the practical con-
sciousness of nature, of other humans and 
of social relations, exists also for others (and 
hence for the speaker too).” 
A question can be raised here; as to at 
what point does a class produce itself as a 
political class? It becomes a political class 
once its mode of reproduction is mediated 
by the state. It is important here to make 
a reference on famous argument that poli-
tics and law, as a superstructure of the real 
(economic) basis, are illusions (Marx, 1904: 
12). Marx didn’t argue that a political class 
is an illusion, but that a general will, as 
a socio-political glue of (the conflicting) 
classes, is what is illusionary. As I demon-
strate further in the paper, this is a core 
distinction on which the project of left pop-
ulism rests upon. 
Because the class can be only a national 
class (that is, organised on a national level, 
not nationalistic), the scale of a struggle can 
only be at a state level, i.e. institutional level, 
implying its political character. Therefore, 
politics is always a product of a ruling class, 
or as Marx and Engels (1974: 64) seminally 
wrote: “The ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class 
which is the ruling material force of socie-
ty, is at the same time its ruling intellectu-
al force.” The struggle of the repressed class 
always begins against the politics of the rul-
ing class. It only forms itself as a struggle 
for politics once the class consciousness is 
gained. Historically, class consciousness is 
only possible in the context of civil socie-
ty, or bürgerliche Gesellshaft (Marx, 1904: 
11; Marx & Engels, 1974: 57). The modern 
context of civil society, urbanisation in 
particular, provides a necessary freedom 
to the individual, so he or she may under-
stand that they are persons. As a person, 
an individual is a bearer of a certain social 
role. The division of labour that always pre-
exists in a society necessarily defines these 
roles. The existing order of civil society, via 
the means of the state, alienates an indi-
vidual from real personhood, by exploiting 
its workforce and exchanging it for a wage. 
This being a part of the official state policy, 
the process of alienation becomes a univer-
sal characteristic of a modern society, cre-
ating masses without property of their own 
(Marx & Engels, 1974: 55-56). The mass pro-
letarian society is the ground of a revolu-
tion, and the entire process is determined 
by class consciousness. 
The class consciousness is the process 
of the organisation of workers. It is a con-
sciousness of a need for a working class to 
be organised at a nation level, just as a bour-
geois class historically did. The proletarian 
class consciousness is always triggered by 
the process of exploitation or, in political 
philosophy vocabulary, by the rise of ine-
qualities. However, the process of building 
the class consciousness is always a politi-
cal one, since its primary goal is to create a 
national political organisation and, in time, 
an international one. I infer that in Marx 
and Engels’s account, class consciousness 
is a political one, while the political class 
is a general name for illusionary struggles. 
In the final part of the paper, I will use this 
conclusion to answer the question of wheth-
er the project of left populism built the polit-
ical feature of class consciousness. 
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The historical context in which Marx 
and Engels wrote about the class conscious-
ness is that of the second industrial revolu-
tion, political turmoil with absolutism in 
Europe, and the beginning of expansionist 
colonialism. Albeit all of these structural 
elements led to the dominance of world cap-
italism, the historical context in which left 
populism articulates its political ideas and 
agendas is radically different from that of 
the mid19th century. The nature of capital-
ism itself has been shifted from industrial to 
financial capitalism. This structural change 
of capitalism entails changes in political 
and legal systems by enforcing the hegem-
ony of neoliberal political ideology and the 
primacy of human rights over national and 
political rights. 
These structural changes have had a 
significant impact on social relations. The 
hegemony of pluralistic democracies has 
led to the growing pluralisation of social 
interest, justified by the human right’s legal 
doctrine. This pluralisation was seen as a 
problem even for early Marxists, as Edu-
ard Bernstein’s seminal denunciations of 
Marx’s idea of a revolution under a unified 
workers movement for reasons of difference 
of interests of trade unions and industrial 
branches. Today, due to the expanded divi-
sion of labour between primary, secondary 
and tertiary modes of production caused by 
globalisation and the expansion of financial 
capitalism, it makes it almost impossible for 
workers to unite on a single front against 
rising social and economic inequalities. 
One of the most influential politi-
cal philosophers of left populism, Ernes-
to Laclau (2005: 35), frames, thereof, the 
problem in terms of demands. For Laclau, 
the social interaction rests on fulfilled 
demands, meaning that all social interac-
tion is structurally defined. The fulfilment 
of the demands therefore needs to be struc-
turally determined as well, meaning that 
the power can be recognised only to formal 
institutions. More precisely, due to the plu-
ralistic character of contemporary societies, 
formal institutions need to make choic-
es when (re)distributing demands, making 
them political. Therefore, political praxis 
has an “ontological primacy” (Laclau 2005: 
33) over all other social practices in articu-
lating demands. This type of social behav-
iour Laclau terms as “the logic of difference” 
(2005: 36).
It is not difficult to see why for Laclau 
politics and populism are “interchangea-
ble terms” (Arditi, 2007: 48). Populism is in 
Laclau’s account a synonym for an alterna-
tive to an existing institutional structural 
solution. It is a political necessity in which 
different and often divergent interest artic-
ulate in a single unifying political idea (or 
at least, a cluster of intertwined ideas). To 
explain this process, Laclau (2005: 37) 
introduces the idea of the “equivalentian 
chain”, i.e. the result of reaggregation of 
interests under a single political end. This 
idea is very similar to the idea of class con-
sciousness, but it has a different logic of 
articulation: while the class consciousness 
presupposes that all subjects have similar 
sufferings and therefore a common inter-
est, an equivalentian chain starts from the 
idea that sufferings are radically different 
yet connected with an inability of politi-
cal institutions to fulfil their demands. Put 
differently: “Left populism on the contra-
ry wants to recover democracy to deepen 
and extend it. A left populist strategy aims 
at federating the democratic demands into 
a collective will to construct a ‘we’, a ‘peo-
ple’ confronting a common adversary: the 
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oligarchy. This requires the establishment of 
a chain of equivalence among the demands 
of the workers, the immigrants and the pre-
carious middle class, as well as other demo-
cratic demands, such as those of the LGBT 
community” (Mouffe, 2018: 43).
I can assert that class consciousness and 
the equivalentian chain are not identical 
concepts. However, are they interchange-
able? Does a struggle against inequalities 
change its meaning by introducing one 
or another concept as the core one? These 
questions can be answered by analysing 
the steps in which the equivalentian chain 
is used to define populism. Laclau (2005: 
37-38) recognises three of such steps. First-
ly, the social unrests that are generated by 
individual demands are just “the tip of the 
iceberg” (Laclau, 2005: 37) and an analy-
sis would show that underneath it there is 
always a wider social problem. Therefore, 
the core of the problem regarding pop-
ulism is in the inadequate representations 
by political institutions. When subjects rec-
ognise this problem and take individual 
actions against the institutions, they trans-
form themselves into “democratic subjects” 
(Laclau, 2005: 37). This transformation is 
always at a micro scale, since the demands 
that democratic subject strive to fulfill are 
always particularistic. Once particularistic 
demands reach a certain number, the equiv-
alentian chain starts rolling out, generating 
the next step in forming populism. 
The first step is sufficiently similar to 
Marx and Engels’s idea of the development 
of class consciousness to state its inter-
changeability. They too argue that demands 
are particularistic in the beginning, i.e. 
that workers always notice poor working 
conditions in their own factories and only 
later do they try to transform this strug-
gle into a universal one. The second step 
that Laclau (2005: 38) presupposes is simi-
lar to the concept of class consciousness. He 
argues that once particularistic demands 
start aggregating, they are bound to lead 
to the transformation of a democratic sub-
ject to a populistic one. The populist subject 
is the one that belongs to a partisan group 
that defend the hegemonic idea that uni-
fies all particularistic demands under a sin-
gle banner. Laclau (2005: 39) terms this idea 
as a signifier, i.e. the concept of representa-
tion that allows a populistic movement to 
remain coherent despite the fact of hetero-
geneity of pluralistic demands. Developing 
this idea further to political action, Chan-
tal Mouffe (2018: 84) asserts that left pop-
ulism should give up the idea that socialism 
is the hegemonic signifier and needs to turn 
to democracy. In constructing the populis-
tic subject, Mouffe (2018: 82) claims that the 
contemporary context of pluralistic socie-
ties dispels the primacy of the working class 
in a political struggle against social ine-
qualities: “However, there is no reason to 
assume that the working class has a priori 
privileged role in the anti-capitalist strug-
gle. Indeed, there are no priori privileged 
places in the anti-capitalist struggle. There 
are many points of antagonism between 
capitalism and various sectors of the pop-
ulation, and this means that, when this 
struggle is envisaged as an extension of the 
democratic principles, there will be a varie-
ty of anti-capitalist struggles.”
Finally, the third step for Laclau (2005: 
38) is the struggle itself. He argues that the 
nature of the struggle is determined by the 
nature of populism, i.e. the second step. The 
hegemonic signifier that unites the heter-
ogenic democratic subjects into one popu-
listic subject creates a binary front between 
those who have the power and those 
deprived of it (“underdogs”). In the final 
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step, populism creates images of friends and 
enemies, the latter one being those who hold 
the power of political institutions in their 
hands. The populistic struggle is the strug-
gle for the change of role-play at the level of 
representation, from the underdog to pow-
er-holder; and this feature is what, accord-
ing to Laclau (2005: 47), makes all populist 
movements democratic and political in their 
nature. Finally, the changed nature of strug-
gle leads to a redefinition of the solution to 
the problem of inequalities in a society: a 
society becomes more equal not by elim-
inating economic inequalities, albeit by 
reconfiguring political ones. Therefore, the 
prime enemy of the populist subject is not 
capitalism per se; it is neoliberalism and 
its appraised form of democracy – liberal 
democracy. 
The second and third steps show the sig-
nificant divergence of Laclau’s account from 
the concept of class consciousness. There 
are at least two differences that can be iden-
tified. The first one concerns the sequence 
of structural changes that (left) populism 
is making. As I showed in the second part 
of the paper, Marx and Engels argue that 
the struggle comes before class conscious-
ness. Therefore, one first needs to know 
against whom he or she is fighting so one 
can find allies for the struggle. In the dia-
lectics of class consciousness, it is impossi-
ble to achieve synthesis without antithesis: 
in Marx and Engels’s scenario, the antithe-
sis of the deprivileged class is the privileged 
capitalist class. In Laclau’s scenario, the rec-
ognition of antithesis comes only after the 
populist subject is formed, i.e. when the 
(democratic) class consciousness is already 
triggered. 
The second difference is in the domain 
of the concept. A populist subject, though 
it strives to include the excluded identities 
and deprivileged subjects, is logically a thin-
ner concept than the one on class conscious-
ness. The credo that constitutes the core of 
the class consciousness concept is that the 
political dimension of the process of cre-
ating an overall national and internation-
al workers organisation will ultimately lead 
to a classless society, or on a moderate scale, 
an equal society. The concept of the populist 
subject strives only to transform the institu-
tions to be more inclusive (Mouffe, 2018: 93), 
i.e. to (re)democratise society. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: LEFT 
POPULISM CREATES A POLITICAL 
CLASS
There are two driving arguments for 
left populism and its redefinition of classi-
cal Marxism I analysed in this paper. One 
argument is more in line with the structur-
al thesis of Marxism, buttressed by the cri-
sis of financial capitalism followed by the 
neoliberal political crisis. The other argu-
ment leans more on moral elements, by 
focusing on underrepresentation of identi-
ties in the context of neoliberalism and the 
liberal democracy. Both of these arguments, 
to more or less extent, change the nature 
of struggle described by Marx and Engels. 
Left populism creates a political class that is 
unable to generate class consciousness. 
There are two consequences of left pop-
ulism being a concept that entails the cre-
ation of a political class. First is its inability 
to organise a movement on a national level. 
The moral dimension of left populism has 
empirically shown not to be sufficient to 
make a movement sustainable. “Occupy 
Wall Street”, “Podemos”, “La Nuit Debout” 
were some of the most successful projects 
of left populism and all had the same prob-
lem: an inability to make their organisation 
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consistent in a long run. As I have shown 
in this paper, the reason for this lies in a 
structural mistake made by these move-
ments. Instead of first building class con-
ciseness between deprived subjects by 
finding a common enemy as the source of 
deprivation, they laid the building blocks 
of their movements respectively on politi-
cal passions that drove democratic subjects 
to raise their voices in the first place. From 
the empirical perspective, right-winged 
and centrist populism, by focusing on “true 
people” vs. the elite legitimation principle is 
more politically successful and sustainable 
then the left populism. 
The second consequence is that left pop-
ulism ultimately becomes illusionary. This 
is not the case only with left populism, 
but with every form of populism, but it is 
most evident on the left side of the spect-
er. By generating a political class whose 
prime goal is to reconfigure existing polit-
ical institutions, left populism drops into a 
wormhole of legislative, a stronghold of pri-
vate property. Left populism therefore rec-
ognises the legitimacy of property relations 
established by the (capitalist) state, even 
before it determines itself as the enemy of 
neoliberalism. As Marx and Engels wrote 
in The German Ideology, there are only two 
classes in a civil society and all other types 
of social struggles are no more than an illu-
sion of the époque. 
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Бojaн Врaнић Оригинални научни рад
ЛЕВИ ПОПУЛИЗАМ:
Демократизација и класна свест
Сажетак
Рад анализира могућности левог популизма да произ-
веде класну свест код оних које Лаклау назива попули-
стичким субјектима. Аутор показује да популистички 
субјекти нису идентични нити међусобно замењиви 
појмови у светлу Марксових и Енгелсових идеја о проле-
терској класи. У првом делу рада, аутор поставља идеју 
популизма на основу три основна елемента: реакционар-
ности, идеје народа, и борбе. У другом делу, анализира се 
идеја класне свести и показује да је она нужно политичка. 
У трећем делу рада, идеја левог популизма се објашњава 
закључцима о класној свести, где се показује структу-
рална неконзистентност идеје популистичког субјекта.
